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I. Introduction
One of the overarching differences between the cost structures of for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals stem from charitable donations. Assuming similar costs to for-profit
hospitals, nonprofits produce a greater quantity output in the long run because the
average revenue consists of the donations per quantity output (D/q) plus the price,
covering a part of the costs or providing excess revenues. Given the aging population
of baby boomers and their likely high quantity demand for medical care, Medicare will
be a much larger player in the medical insurance industry than the private health
insurance companies to which most working families subscribe. When the baby
boomers retire, they will become eligible for Medicare coverage in greater numbers
than previous generations. Rather than paying for what a hospital charges for each
treatment, Medicare pays a set amount to the hospital. As the Medicare fund becomes
increasingly strained with more participants, the Medicare payment plan will become
lean with respect to the amount the organization compensates hospitals for care.
Assuming a fixed level of funding for the Medicare system, there will be
proportionally smaller per capita funding available for reimbursements than in the past.
Medicare spending in 2005 equaled 2.7 percent of the GDP, and at an annual growth
rate of 0.5 percent for Medicare funding this will be 4.5 percent of the total GDP by 2030
(White, 2008). Baby boomers will have to pay more money out of pocket for medical
expenses, particularly with expenses related to hospital visits. When costs increase for
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the baby boomers, however, nonprofit hospitals’ cost structures will be affected, most
notably the average revenue curve. According to the average giving curve outlined by
Russell James and Deanna Sharpe (2007), households earning less than $10,000 give at a
higher rate than any other income level, equaling an average rate of 4.5 percent of posttax income. One explanation for the higher percentage of donations at the lower
income range is due to the number of retirees in this income bracket. In fact, 48 percent
of retired households earning less than $30,000 donate compared to 15 percent of nonretirees earning $80,000 or more who donate. Given that retired households earn
income from pensions and other fixed-income sources, the increased price of Medicare
will decrease their disposable income and wealth, including dollars to donate to
nonprofit hospitals.
In the future, a strain on Medicare funding will lead to reduced reimbursements
to hospitals for treatments relative to prior years. As a result, the recipients of the care
will be required to pay more, either via a co-payment system or, in some cases,
completely out of pocket. Increased individual care payments will reduce disposable
income and decrease the retired household’s ability to donate money to the nonprofit
hospitals and other nonprofit organizations. In response, nonprofit hospitals will be
forced to lower quantity output in order to operate on lower levels of donations and
Medicare reimbursements. While there are some treatments for which Medicare will
require individuals to make partial payments, there are many treatments for which
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Medicare will simply reduce reimbursement without an additional payment from the
recipient. A decrease in the quantity output for the nonprofits will cause the nonprofits
to introduce measures to increase quantity output back to a higher level to help as many
individuals as possible.
According to the idea of managerial sorting, nonprofit managers have an
incentive to produce the greatest amount of output possible and be as efficient as
possible in order to help more individuals than comparably structured proprietary
firms (Hansmann, 1980). Managers of nonprofit hospitals must gain some form of
additional utility from their jobs outside of monetary compensation, which will also
result in the choice to produce at the highest level of output (Hansmann, 1980).
Increasing output will be accomplished by decreasing costs. Lower costs will be
achieved by increasing the quality of care provided. As the costs decrease, the
nonprofits will increase the quantity supply of healthcare, which will benefit all
healthcare demanders, not just those participating in Medicare. This will also allow the
nonprofits to reduce prices, which will force the for-profit hospitals to engage in similar
cost-saving measures.

II. Problem Statement
The baby boomer generation will soon become eligible for Medicare in large
numbers. On average, older people require more medical care than younger people.
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When more people use Medicare as their primary insurance provider, the amount
Medicare reimburses per person will decrease assuming no additional allocation of
funding beyond the historical levels. Current Medicare funding comes from the Federal
Insurance Corporation Act (FICA) tax taken from workers’ paychecks. In 2007
Medicare provided coverage for 44.1 million people. According to the US Census
Bureau, the baby boomer generation totals 78.1 million people, a number far greater
those currently covered under the program.
With the current number of workers roughly 75 percent larger than the number
of Medicare recipients providing a subsequent $30 billion operating surplus in 2007,
Medicare can sustainably operate the fund. This relationship will soon be reversed, as
the baby boomers will retire and no longer pay into Medicare. However, the number of
American workers that will remain will be the roughly 41 million individuals of
Generation X, leaving a substantial disparity between those contributing to and those
drawing from Medicare. The Millennials, those born to the baby boomers between the
years 1977 and 1994, account for 70 million people, and the oldest of this generation
have just begun entering the workforce (Generation, 2006). Assuming the age and
experience of those near retirement command higher wages than those of the young
Millenials, relatively less income will be generated by FICA for Medicare. However,
according to the 2008 Medicare Annual Report, Medicare expenditures will need to
increase from 3.2 percent today to 10.8 percent of GDP by 2082. While this projection is
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far in the future and will affect more than just the baby boomers’ retirements, either an
increase in the FICA tax or a new source of income will be necessary to meet these
growing expenditures. The FICA tax would need to increase from 3.1 percent to 11.4
percent over this same time period. As has been the trend in recent years, Americans
elect politicians that fight to lower taxes, and an 8 percent increase in the FICA tax will
be met with strong opposition. While the issue of funding will directly affect baby
boomers, this will also greatly affect both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
Nonprofit hospitals can afford to operate at a higher cost per unit of output than
for-profit hospitals for a number of reasons. First, the idea of trust may make people
willing to pay more for services from a nonprofit hospital than from a for-profit
hospital. Simply having incomplete information about the good or service provided
makes the element of trust much more important for a nonprofit relative to a for-profit
organization. The profit-maximizing nature of for-profits draws into question the
motives of the firms, particularly in a healthcare setting in which the consumer may
have relatively little information about the service provided. As discussed briefly
above, nonprofit managers move through a sorting process in which their motives are
tested. Weisbrod (1988) describes the preferences between managers choosing between
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors based on motives and personality traits. Rawls,
Ullrich, and Nelson (1975) conducted a study comparing the motives of individuals
choosing the nonprofit and for-profit sectors. The results of the study showed those
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preferring the nonprofit sector placed a high level of importance on being cheerful,
forgiving, and most importantly helpful. Conversely, those preferring the proprietary
sector placed a higher level of importance on financial prosperity, ambition, neatness,
obedience, and dependability.
There is a government failure to meet the needs of all those that require
healthcare. Programs including Medicare and Medicaid were introduced to help offset
the number of individuals that are uninsured and unable to pay for medical expenses
out of pocket. With an unmet demand requiring medical care, nonprofit hospitals
provide care at either a minimum or no cost to these demanders. Donations and excess
revenues in other submarkets counterbalance lost revenue from such cases, allowing
nonprofits to produce a higher quantity output than their for-profit counterparts who
would pay the owners with the excess profits. However, when donations decrease
because retirees will have to spend more of their incomes on personal medical care due
to relatively less Medicare reimbursements, the average revenue will decrease and the
nonprofit hospital may not be able to absorb the price difference described above.
Therefore, the nonprofit will either need to reduce quantity output or find a way to
lower costs. By nature of nonprofits seeking to provide a good or service to meet an
unmet demand, the answer will not be reduced output. Rather, the nonprofit will look
to find ways to lower costs. While this paper focuses primarily on affects of baby
boomers on nonprofit hospitals, there are also implications for the proprietary hospitals.
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Profit-maximizing organizations are not subject to the non-distribution constraint, and
therefore have an incentive in the short-run to reduce costs and subsequently increase
profit. Assuming the same story with Medicare providing less reimbursement for
treatments relative to previous years, for-profit organizations will also find ways to
reduce costs to maximize profits.

III. Review of the Literature
As I move towards discussing the implications of the problems with Medicare
demand and funding, there is a body of research that helps frame the context for the
resulting story. Issues ranging from managerial sorting to the quality of care all
contribute to the overall structure and philosophy of the nonprofit hospitals. With the
understanding of these key concepts we can work towards an effective resolution to the
Medicare problem.
Henry Hansmann (1980) addresses a number of ideas relevant to the nonprofit
sector. First, he argues that managers will take relatively lower wages than their
counterparts in the for-profit sector. This is the result of a screening process in which
the “greedy” individuals move to the proprietary sector in order to reap financial
rewards for their work. Conversely, the “craftsmanlike” managers get utility from
working for nonprofits that are of high quality and have a charitable mission. The
nonprofit managers gain satisfaction from helping as many individuals as possible in
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accordance with the organization’s mission. Whereas the nonprofit sector is subject to
the non-distribution constraint, proprietary firms have managers that attempt to
maximize profit, generally irrespective of the quantity output. Second, Hansmann
discusses the way nonprofits disburse excess revenue via cross-subsidization. A
nonprofit may be able to take excess revenue from one area of the organization and
cross-subsidize other products or services operating at a loss.
Burton Weisbrod (1991) discusses some of the issues surrounding pricing and
payment strategies of the healthcare industry and how these affect the care a patient
receives. For many years the availability of insurance, both private and governmentsponsored, created a moral hazard situation. Doctors and patients had the ability to
utilize more healthcare services simply because such options would be covered by the
insurance provider and were not necessarily beneficial to the treatment of the
individual. Such disregard for costs led to increased insurance claims, and in the case
of Medicare, this depleted the fund at a greater rate than if doctors used only the
necessary treatments. As a result of this moral hazard, private insurance and Medicare
set average levels at which healthcare providers were reimbursed for each treatment.
This created another problem; as reimbursement for treatments decreased there was
less funding for research funded by these treatments. Medical research is highly
important to discovering new cures, better treatment methods, and lower-cost ways to
conduct such treatments. Therefore, limiting reimbursements as a cost-saving measure
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for insurance providers limits the ability of the market to find cheaper treatment
methods for the future.
Jennifer Lubell (20072) describes problems of rising costs and sicker patients that
have plagued the healthcare sector. Rising costs make it less affordable for individuals
to go to the doctor, which means individuals wait longer to go to the doctor.
Consequently, treatments that would be affordable (albeit not cheap) will be relatively
less compared to the costs associated with treating an ailment in the later stages of
development. Individuals may continually put off going to the doctor because of the
cost, and in so doing the treatment will become more and more expensive, with the
individuals growing more ill all the while. Robert Gill, the chief financial officer of a St.
Paul, MN hospital, described the Medicare shortfalls every year that lead to the increase
in costs for the hospital for which they must account, increasing the costs for all
healthcare demanders, not just those requiring Medicare reimbursement.
Jennifer Lubell (20071) discusses the limits that Medicare has proposed on its new
reimbursement plan. The plan for fiscal 2008, as it stands, recommends a 2.4 percent
decrease in reimbursement to hospitals for treatment. The current payment system,
which uses coding of treatments, will be affected by this decrease. According to the
Lubell, hospitals enter the codes for the treatment that is provided to a patient and
Medicare reimburses the hospital accordingly. However, Marc Miller, the executive
director of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, states that patients appear to
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be sicker when they are treated at hospitals, yet this has not been factored into the rate
of coding increases. While there are inefficiencies in treatments that drive up costs, the
root of the problem is the relatively sicker patients that require more care than
comparable patients in an earlier stage of a condition. When patients take better care of
themselves and go to the doctor at first sign of a condition the cost of treatment will be
relatively less and require less Medicare reimbursement than the sicker patient.
Therefore, there is room for Medicare to cut back on reimbursements while still paying
for the treatment of patients.
Lawrence Flannagan (2008) describes a situation in which nonprofit hospitals
have been forced to keep up with for-profit hospitals, which has resulted in increased
costs. One of the points he cites is that Americans have demanded private hospital
rooms, which were first delivered by the for-profits. In order to maintain competition,
the nonprofits built hospitals with private rooms instead of the more traditional wings,
which had allowed nurses to keep track of many patients at the same time. Another
reason for the increase in costs for nonprofits has to do with the amount of care
provided to those unable to pay. For a time, nonprofits could file claims with Medicare
to recover the costs of treating these individuals, which drove-up the costs that
Medicare had to reimburse. Similarly, regulations have changed, which require
compensation to employees in positions where volunteers once worked.
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Jeffrey Krasner (2007) describes six Massachusetts hospitals that have been
commended for their quality work and subsequent cost efficiency. There are certain
methods of treatment, such as the use of a catheter to inject medication, that have been
the source of infections for many patients due to improper installation of the device.
When faulty treatments result in complications requiring more treatments, costs for that
patient rise. However, if the nurses take enough care to properly set the catheter, as in
this example, the patient benefits in his or her health and the treatment costs will be
limited to those the original condition. Being exposed to new conditions once in the
hospital is an indicator of low quality care, and avoiding hospital negligence as
described above will lead to more efficient use of resources (labor and capital) resulting
in relatively lower costs. Rewarding nonprofits for being more efficient and providing
better quality care the first time is a winning solution to all parties involved. Such
efforts serve to decrease the cost curves for the nonprofits, which result in a higher level
of output for the nonprofit.
Chapin White’s (2008) article talks about how the rate of growth in Medicare
spending has decreased dramatically over the years. One of the first reasons for the
slowdown is that Congress has pulled back on the amount that Medicare pays out per
individual due to the increasing number of participants. Early on, the goal was to get
many people to buy into the Medicare system. Medicare encouraged participation by
paying for most or all of an individual’s expenses. Another reason for the slowdown
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can be attributed to a similar declining rate of growth in the private-insurance sector.
This trend will continue as even more participants enter into the program, which helps
to show the need for nonprofits to reduce costs in order to accept lower reimbursement
from Medicare.
James and Sharpe (2007) explain a “u-shaped” giving curve relative to income
due to the nature of charitable contributions across the income spectrum. Highlighting
the need for charitable contributions, Brooks’ 2004 study found that 20 percent of the
income of all nonprofit organizations comes from donations. In general terms, this
statistic exhibits bias, as the healthcare industry accounts for much of the total income
of nonprofits and primarily collects on fees for goods and services. James and Sharpe’s
study separates income into $10,000 increments up to $100,000, $100,000 - $149,999, and
$150,000+. According to these figures, the group earning less than $10,000 had the
highest level of after-tax charitable giving, donating 4.55 percent of the household
income based on the sample. As the income level rises up to the $100,000 we see a
decreasing trend in charitable giving, dropping to as low as 1.34 percent of after-tax
income. One source that the authors cite as a reason we see the higher percentage of
giving at lower incomes is that pensioners (retirees) earn very little income (presumably
only income from a pension or other fixed-payment sources), yet these households have
significant estate values and give at a higher rate due to their ability to donate and still
maintain a comfortable lifestyle.
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James Andreoni (1990) discusses the idea of altruism with respect to different
types of donors. First, he introduces the utility function of an individual
Ui = Ui(xi,G,gi)∀i where xi is consumption of the private good, gi is their gift to the public

good, and G is the total amount of the public good. For an individual whose utility
function does not include G, Ui = Ui(xi,gi)∀i , then this person is motivated to give purely
by warm-glow, which is simply the gain in utility from the gift of giving to another in
need. If an individual’s utility function is Ui = Ui(xi,G )∀i , then this person is purely
altruistic, gaining utility from own consumption and the total public good. An
impurely altruistic individual’s utility function has gi as a function of G. Therefore, the
utility function for this individual is Ui = Ui(xi,G,gi[G])∀i . With the different motivations
for making charitable contributions there will be different levels of giving according to
the market conditions. For example, an impure altruist will be less likely to give when
G is relatively high.
With these concepts in mind the solution to the problems become increasingly
clear. Although problems have arisen with respect to Medicare spending there are
proven methods to reducing costs and subsequently alleviating the strain on the
Medicare fund. With a few important measures, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals
will combat this problem. The byproduct will be better care and decreased per capita
spending, which will benefit both healthcare demanders and the hospitals.
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IV. Economic Theory
As the baby boomers reach retirement there will be an increase in the demand for
Medicare. Workers primarily receive healthcare coverage via private insurance through
their employers. When the workers retire, they will lose this private healthcare
coverage. The baby boomers will have three options: they can get private health
insurance, not have insurance, or subscribe to Medicare. The increase in the demand
leads to an increase in the price of Medicare. However, as was noted in the 2008
Medicare Annual Report, the amount of funding necessary to cover the baby boomers and
future generations under Medicare will be roughly 10.8 percent of the GDP compared
to the current 3.2 percent. For the average worker, this translates to a FICA tax increase
from 3.1 percent to 11.4 percent by 2082. Based on the Medicare projections, the per
capita level of coverage in Medicare will likely decrease during this period of high rate
of retirement, assuming no alternative source of revenue.
The argument for individuals using Medicare as opposed to using private health
insurance providers or paying completely out of pocket considers an overlappinggenerations model. Just as with social security, each individual lives in two time
periods; one time period is when the individual is young, earning an income and
consuming C1; the second time period is when the individual is old (retirement-aged)
and no longer works for an income, yet still consumes C2, which is left over from when
the individual was young. I assume that income is perfectly storable; therefore, C1 + C2
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= 1. The basic utility function for this individual is U(C1,C2)=C1C2. Using a constrained
optimization technique, the Lagrangian for this case is L (C 1, C 2, λ ) = C 1C 2 + λ [1 − C 1 − C 2 ] .
The first-order conditions state the following:

∂L
= 0 ⇒ C 2 − λ* = 0
∂C1
∂L
L2 =
= 0 ⇒ C1 − λ* = 0 ,
∂C 2
∂L
= 0 ⇒ 1− C1 − C 2 = 0
Lλ =
∂λ

L1 =

such that

λ* = C 1
λ* = C 2

⇒ C1 = C 2.

Substitute and solve for C1:
1 − C1 − C 1 = 0
1 − 2C 1 = 0

*

⇒ C1 =

1
= C 2 *.
2

Under the original utility function, the maximum utility subject to the constraint is
 1  1   1 
U * (C 1* ,C 2* ) = C 1 * C 2* =    =   .
 2  2   4 

Under the Medicare program, however, the individual can lend (1- C1) to the
government when young and receive 1+n(1- C1) when old, where n = (

N y − N o)
,
No

Ny

is the

number of young individuals, No is the number of old individuals, and 0 < n < 1. In
practical terms, this model assumes positive population growth, which equates to a
positive rate of growth in the workforce. Accordingly, the new constraint with
Medicare is C 1 + C 2 = 1 + n (1 − C 1) . The new Lagrangian is
L(C1,C 2, λ ) = C1C 2 + λ [C1 + C 2 − 1 − n (1 − C1)].

The first order conditions state the following:
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∂L
= 0 ⇒ C 2 + λ *( n + 1) = 0
∂C1
∂L
,
= 0 ⇒ C1 + λ* = 0
L2 =
∂C 2
∂L
= 0 ⇒ C1 + C 2 −1− n (1− C1) = 0
Lλ =
∂λ
L1 =

such that

λ* = −C1

C2
−C 2 ⇒ C1 = n + 1 . Substitute and solve for C2:
λ* =
n +1

 C2 
C2
+ C 2 − 1 − n
=0
 n + 1
n +1
n +1
C 2 ** =
2

⇒

 n + 1
C1 + 
− 1 − n (1 − C1) = 0
 2 
.
1
C1 ** =
2

Under the new conditions, the maximum utility subject to these constraints is
 1  n + 1 n + 1
.
U ** (C 1 ** ,C 2 ** ) =  
=
 2  2 
4

Since

U

**

> U

* , individuals gain more utility from having a Medicare system than not

having such a system in place. Therefore, there is an incentive to keep Medicare
properly funded in order to meet at least part of each individual’s healthcare needs.
As demonstrated by the utility maximization comparison, the individual only
gains more utility with Medicare under the assumption that the exogenous rate of
population growth, and therefore growth in the workforce, is positive. However, the
number of people in old age (baby boomers) will reduce n , which will decrease the
ability of the Medicare fund to insure individuals at the same per capita level as prior
years. If Medicare receives income of (1 − C 1) and has expenses of 1 + n (1 − C 1) , the result
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must be greater than or equal to zero assuming no additional source of revenue. Net
revenue is

(1 − C1) − [1+ n (1 − C1)] ≥ 0
 1 
 1 
1 −  − 1 + n1−  ≥ 0 .
 2 
 2 
n 1
− ≥0
2 2

As n decreases and eventually becomes negative as projected by the end of the century,
the restrictions on n adjust to −1 < n < 1 , this relationship decreases the ability of
Medicare to operate and the fund will eventually fail. Thus, Medicare will need to find
additional funding from a source other than the FICA tax to combat this decrease over
time. Although additional funding is required to fund Medicare under these
conditions, Medicare can still operate but at a lower per capita level of coverage.
Unlike a traditional market, Medicare has a certain level of funding each year from
the FICA tax. The total income of the fund changes annually based on employment
statistics, particularly the number of individuals employed and per capita income,
which directly affect the FICA tax. When the economy moves toward full employment
and per capita
income
Figure
1

S1

P

going into the Medicare
case when the baby
the number of

increases,
the amount of money
S0
fund increases. However, the

P1

boomers retire will be such that

P0

individuals contributing to

D1
D0
Q1

Q0

Q

Whitcomb 19
the Medicare fund through the FICA tax will decrease, which reduces the supply of the
Medicare fund from S0 to S1. As the supply of the Medicare fund decreases, the
quantity output, in this case the number of individuals that Medicare covers, will
decrease at price P0 from Q0 to Q1. Similarly, the number of individuals strictly using
private insurance will decrease as individuals begin subscribing to Medicare, which
increases the demand for Medicare from D0 to D1.

Therefore, as demanders bid up the price of Medicare they do so at their own expense.
The likeliest solution to this change in demand will require demanders to engage in a
co-payment system to cover the additional costs of Medicare, amounting to the
difference between P0 and P1. According to this model, however, there will be
individuals who will be neither able nor willing to pay the additional costs of Medicare
as the price is bid up. Assuming total nonprofit donations include a substantial portion
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of donations for the healthcare industry, these cost increases will also affect donations,
which decreases the ability of nonprofits to provide medical services to some
individuals. Instead of donating to the nonprofits, individuals covered by Medicare
will use their income and wealth to cover parts of their medical costs subject to the copayment systems that will result from this shortage of funding.
The standard nonprofit model is very similar to that of the traditional for-profit
firm. The average revenue is the price of a treatment plus the amount of donations per
quantity output. A greater demand for Medicare bids up the cost per individual, which
translates to higher co-payments per subscriber. Understanding the relationship
between the donations to nonprofits and retirees, higher premiums and co-payments
will reduce these individuals’ abilities to donate. Wealth and after-tax income will be
reallocated, dollar for dollar, to personal medical expenses away from donations.
According to Salamon, donations to the healthcare sector in 1996 accounted for roughly
10 percent of total charitable donations to nonprofits. Although the donations at the
lower end of the giving curve will decrease, there are no indications that the higher
income levels will increase donations. Therefore, there will be a reduced level of total
donations.
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Figure 2
P
MC

ATC0
AR0 = P0 + D0/q0
AR1 = P0 + D1/q2

P0
P1

q1

q2 q0

q

Average revenue will decrease reflecting lower donations and a higher quantity of
medical services produced. Assuming no changes in the price of hospital treatments, as
the cost increase of Medicare rests solely on the demanders through higher co-pays, the
quantity produced will decrease from q0 to q2 where AR1 intersects ATC0 reflecting the
changes in the donations.
While most of the baby boomers receive the care they need at price P0, Figure 1
above shows there will be a shortage of Medicare funding at P0 that causes demanders
to pay out of pocket the difference between P0 and P1. As a result, many individuals
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will be unable to afford or will be unwilling to pay the additional costs of medical
treatment beyond the P0 level of Medicare reimbursement. Medical care is a basic
necessity and individuals that forgo the expense of regular checkups and doctor visits
in the early stages of an illness will face greater complications if they wait to see a
doctor. To help alleviate this problem, nonprofits must use their excess revenue to
provide care for these individuals at a reduced price to the demander, thus producing a
higher level of output.
In both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, there are certain treatments that
provide profits or excess revenues. For example, individuals file insurance
reimbursement claims for trips to the emergency room or other natural illnesses that
require medical care. Furthermore, emergency room care can be especially costly for
both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals due to the laws that require these hospitals to
provide care for all individuals that walk through the door. While most people that
enter hospitals are insured or can otherwise pay for their treatments, there is a group of
uninsured individuals that receive treatment and cannot pay. These cases provide
financial hardships for the hospitals, as the great cost that goes into these emergency
room visits comes straight out of the hospitals’ profits or reserves. Keeping in mind
that Medicare reimburses the hospitals for what Medicare deems to be the total amount
that a treatment should cost, emergency room visits do not provide large profits or
excess revenues. However, insurance providers, particularly Medicare, do not
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reimburse subscribers for cosmetic surgeries, such as a face-lift or liposuction.
Therefore, the costs of these treatments are not limited in the way Medicare limits
reimbursements and the hospitals can charge higher prices to the consumers of the
treatment.
Applying the idea of cross-subsidization the nonprofit can use excess revenue
from one submarket, such as cosmetic surgery, to fund research and lower costs in
another submarket. As discussed by Weisbrod (1991), the excess revenues can be used
to fund new research that will lower costs of treatments in the future. Similarly, excess
revenue can be used to increase the quality of care patients receive in order to reduce
costs. For example, better training and equipment can ensure that a patient’s risk of
infection is reduced and nurses can better monitor the effectiveness of the treatments.
Although new equipment may be expensive, increasing the quality of care can finance
the costs of new equipment.
According to AARP, spending on treatments, tests, and hospital visits that were
Figure 3
P
MC
unnecessary
amounted to $700 billion, which
MC
was roughly

30% of the overall healthcare

expenditures in

2007.
ATC0
ATC1
AR0 = P0 + D0/q0

P0

AR1 = P0 + D1/q2
P1

q1

q2 q0 q3

q
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If this unnecessary spending were used to finance cost-saving equipment and research,
clearly there would be a significant reduction in the total cost of healthcare. Therefore,
this represents a decrease in the average total cost for the nonprofit from ATC0 to ATC1.
When costs decrease, this will provide greater excess revenue and allow for more
research or other capital improvements in the short run, measures that will help further
reduce costs. According to Figure 3 above, in the long run quantity output will increase
to q3 where ATC1 and AR1 intersect.
The for-profit hospitals will be affected by these changing market conditions
with similar end results but with different implications. Given the motives of for-profit
firms to generate profit for the owners, these firms will continue to charge the market
price, which provides economic profits in the short run according to the model. When
Medicare reduces reimbursements, the proprietary hospitals will collect the remaining
fraction of the price from the individuals receiving the care assuming these individuals
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can pay. Just as there are individuals that cannot afford to pay for treatments in
nonprofit hospitals, the same problem exists in for-profit hospitals, forcing the hospitals
to write-down the lost revenue. These firms do not have an incentive to change pricing
and quality of treatment practices based on Medicare reimbursement changes alone. As
the nonprofit hospitals respond to the decrease in donations by reducing the quantity
output, the proprietary firm will try to increase output to meet the unmet demand.
One response that will produce additional output is to increase the price of the
care, but the nonprofit firms will maintain their prices at the current market rate
maximize profits. As the nonprofits increase treatment quality and thereby reduce
costs, those individuals that seek medical care may have a greater incentive to go to a
nonprofit hospital to benefit from the better quality care. In response, the proprietary
firms must also increase their quality of care to reduce costs such that the marginal
revenue and marginal cost intersect at a point beyond q1.
Figure 4
P

MC0

MC1

ATC0
ATC1

P0

q1 q2

q
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If more healthcare demanders, not just those covered by Medicare, prefer the higher
quality of care that the nonprofits will provide, then the proprietary hospitals must
respond by also increasing the quality. This will work by providing better training to
the doctors and nurses to ensure that patient safety is the priority, making sure that the
treatments are only what are necessary to effectively treat the patients. When these
measures are taken, the proprietary firm will reduce costs, which will provide a greater
quantity output and attract demanders who prefer a hospital with a reputation for good
quality.

V. Results/Data
For this regression analysis, I look at a number of contributing factors to the total
donations received annually by nonprofits from 1968 to 2006. The dependent variable
is the total contributions per capita in thousands of 2006 dollars. The first independent
variable is RGDP per capita in thousands of dollars. The second independent variable is
real Medicare spending per capita in 2006 dollars. The third independent variable is the
maximum annual income tax rate categorized into low (0 percent – 35 percent), medium
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(36 percent – 50 percent), and high (51 percent – 91 percent). All dollar amounts are
converted to 2006 dollars transformed by the CPI of each of those years.
Although my final model included only the statistically significant variables, I
chose a larger group of independent variables for this regression analysis. Among the
original independent variables I included the different levels of contributions broken
down by source, which included corporations, individuals, and foundations. My main
objective was to see how charitable giving is affected with respect to different economic
factors and how this would lead to further behavioral changes in factors of giving. For
example, I would expect individual giving to increase when the cost of giving
decreases. However, these variables proved to be insignificant in providing strength to
the model. Further, there may be some behavioral changes in giving, particularly with
respect to altruism, when the amount of giving increases. A pure altruist who gets
utility from knowing there is greater equity among all may be less inclined to give if
more people already gave. The same can be said for the reverse, as a pure altruist may
be more inclined to give when per capita giving is low. Further, I would expect donors
to be somewhat mindful of the organization to which they contribute. If an
organization has not gone through an effective managerial sorting process to find an
efficient manager, the organization may operate inefficiently, perhaps causing hesitancy
and less altruism on behalf of the donor.
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I use the per capita individual donations in 2006 dollars to show the relative
changes in donations in total dollars as opposed to percentage changes. One of the
reasons for this is to show a greater variability in the data, whereas when giving is
expressed in percentage terms the total variation in individual contributions is 0.4
percent. RGDP per capita helps show, on average, the amount individuals donate
relative to their income. Next I included Medicare expenditures in real dollars per
capita in order to frame this analysis in the context of hospitals. For the tax rate I broke
the variable into three groups according to a clear trichotomy graphically displayed in a
plot of the data in an effort to normalize the data. Originally when the model included
the tax rate as a quantitative the variable, this coefficient was not statistically significant.
Making this a categorical variable fixed the problem to make tax rate statistically
significant. This is also the reason I chose to leave this as a categorical variable rather
than change the different tax rate levels to dummy variables, as the latter technique led
to a decrease in the robustness of the model and produced insignificant tax rate dummy
coefficients.
These data were collected from three sources. First, the total annual charitable
contributions and population statistics were all collected from the Nonprofit Almanac
2008. This annual publication from Urban Institute Press includes data relevant to
various trends in the economy, including giving and volunteering. Second, the GDP
and Medicare spending figures came from USGovernmentSpending.com, while the
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highest tax percentage data were collected from the Citizens for Tax Justice website.
The GDP and Medicare spending figures were originally unadjusted for inflation and
population, while the highest tax bracket percentages was originally a quantitative
variable. Last, the CPI figures were obtained from the City of Seattle’s website.
I hypothesize that total donations will increase when the price of giving
decreases (meaning there is an increase in the tax rate), when RGDP per capita
increases, and when Medicare spending per capita decreases. First, I believe total
donations will increase when the tax rate increases because this tax increase will result
in a lower opportunity cost to donate income. Reducing taxable income via donations
allows an individual to change tax brackets, thus reducing overall taxes paid. Second,
an increase in RGDP per capita equates to more income in the economy and in the
pockets of individuals. A higher RGDP per capita increases personal disposable
income. With respect to the finding of James and Sharpe of a u-shaped giving curve
and the baby-boomer population heading towards retirement age, there will be a
greater percentage of individuals in the less than $10,000 taxable income group that
gives a relatively high percentage of income. Retired individuals will have a higher
level of wealth, on average, than the typical wage earners in this low-income bracket,
which helps explain the high percentage of income giving. Last, I expect a negative
relationship between Medicare spending and charitable contributions for the reasons of
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crowding out discussed above. As the government spends a higher percentage of total
federal outlays on Medicare the purely altruistic donors will be less likely to give.
Using the model described above, I found the relationship between total
donations per capita, RGDP per capita, Medicare spending per capita, and tax rate to be
consistent with my hypotheses. The coefficients for RGDP and tax rate were both
positive, while the Medicare spending and intercept coefficients were both negative.
For the reasons discussed above the signs of these coefficients are consistent with the
predictions. The intercept coefficient can simply be explained via extrapolation, as we
would not expect to see zero donation dollars. The resulting regression output is as
follows:
Y = -0.8930 + 0.0507 X1 – 0.0004 X2 + 0.0791 X3,
(-4.371)

(5.856)

(-2.398)

(4.752)∗

where Y = total donations per capita in thousands of 2006 dollars, X1 = RGDP per capita
in thousands of 2006 dollars, X2 = Medicare spending per capita in 2006 dollars, and X3 =
the tax rate according to the 0 (low), 1 (moderate), 2 (high) scale. The R2 of this model is
0.89, which suggests this is a highly robust model for time-series data. In conducting
analyses of the data, I determined that autocorrelation was present and produced a
second model that adjusted for autocorrelation. In this new model I included a trend
variable and the AR(1) variable to help capture autocorrelation. However, the results of

∗

t-values. All independent variables are significant at the 5 percent significance level.
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the new model left ambiguity about the presence of autocorrelation and reduced the
explanatory power of the model. Given the adjustments of the model described above,
I do not believe this results in a significant bias on the coefficients.
Using these empirical results, there is a negative relationship between the
amount of government spending on Medicare per capita and the amount of income
donated to nonprofits. If Medicare expenditure per capita decreases by $100, then I will
expect a $0.04 increase in the per capita amount of income donated to nonprofits on
average based on these data holding the tax rate and government spending per capita
constant. In real terms with a population of 300 million people, this translates to a
$12,000,000 increase in charitable giving. However, according to the 2008 Medicare
Annual Report, sustaining the Medicare fund will require an increase in funding to 10.8
percent of GDP by 2082 compared to 3.2 percent in 2007. As a result, based on the
model holding the other variables constant, I will expect a decrease in the overall
charitable donations to nonprofit organizations as the baby boomers retire and enroll in
Medicare.

VI. Conclusion
In order for nonprofit hospitals to adequately respond to the baby boomers that
will rely upon Medicare, both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals will be required to
lower costs in the production of healthcare. The baby boomers will affect nonprofit
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hospitals more than the for-profit hospitals due to the nonprofits’ relationships with
these donors who will increasingly also become patients. Households earning less than
$10,000 per year, a group primarily consisting of retirees, donate at an average rate of
4.5 percent. Consequently, these households will spend more of their incomes (and
wealth) on medical related expenses, which will lower the left side of the “u-shaped”
giving curve. Assuming no additional levels of donations at the other income levels,
the giving curve will now appear in a more “j-like shape.” Therefore, nonprofits will
have a lower level of donations, with D1<D0. Average revenue for nonprofit hospitals
will decrease, AR1<AR0, allowing the hospitals to produce a lower quantity output.
Since nonprofit managers have been screened to be more efficient and shown to seek a
higher level of output, the firms will increase the quality of healthcare supplied in order
to lower costs. Increasing the quality of the care provided will reduce per patient costs
and may provide additional revenue for research to help further reduce costs. This will
allow the nonprofit firms to produce a higher level of output than a similarly structured
for-profit firm adjusting for the lower Medicare reimbursements and a lower AR curve.
When the nonprofit’s costs decrease, the result will be a decrease in the price of
healthcare and an increase in the quantity supply. Medicare subscribers, as well as all
other healthcare demanders, will benefit from the decrease in price, advancing the
mission of the nonprofit to provide additional quantity output for a target group.
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By nature, for-profit firms look for ways to lower costs and increase economic
profit. When the nonprofit hospitals increase the quality of care resulting in a greater
quantity output and lower costs, the nonprofits will decrease the price. When the
nonprofits decrease the price of healthcare, the for-profit firms will respond by
attempting to follow a similar path. To attract healthcare demanders back from the
nonprofits the for-profit firms will decrease the additional costs associated with poor
quality care. As the doctors and nurses provide better care to the patients the costs will
decrease. This is good news for the proprietary firm, as it will increase output and
benefit from greater economic profits.
The further into the future we go the greater the problem will be with respect to
Medicare if the nonprofit firms do not react. Although the baby boomer problem for
Medicare may be resolved by deferring some of the costs back to the demanders, the
depletion of the Medicare fund will present an even greater problem. As discussed in
the 2008 Medicare Annual Report, the amount of funding necessary to support the
Medicare system will be roughly 10.8 percent of the GDP in 2082 compared to 3.2
percent today. Rather than taxing workers an additional 8 percent via the FICA tax to
fund Medicare, the long-term solution will be for the healthcare industry to control
costs by increasing the quality of care and decreasing superfluous treatments. The
drivers of this mission are the nonprofit hospitals in their efforts to provide care for as
many individuals as possible. For-profit hospitals will respond to the efforts of the
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nonprofit firms, and as a result of these efforts healthcare demanders will benefit from
higher quality care.
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VIII. Appendix
Table 1:
Annual
Donations
Per Capita in
Thousands of
2006 $1

Real GDP Per
Capita in
Thousands of
2006 $2

Medicare
Spending Per
Capita in
2006 $3

1968

0.54762437

24.55082851

131.706441

2

1969

0.568838933

25.06007752

150.4502862

2

1970

0.537136356

25.09934793

154.062684

2

1971

0.561330969

25.60649055

157.0202615

2

1972

0.560864924

26.67341846

169.303655

2

1973

0.562369973

26.80420168

165.0561578

2

1974

0.535153405

26.14253246

175.0766834

2

1975

0.503961399

26.30484373

217.0018985

2

1976

0.521893769

27.56178029

251.3177248

2

1977

0.541866369

29.03759555

284.522254

2

1978

0.550180054

29.51648704

303.1264668

2

1979

0.555909103

28.90356021

306.2341856

2

1980

0.544021866

27.86120612

327.8930959

2

1981

0.548025487

28.50846767

365.3641931

2

1982

0.535224872

28.76891447

415.0706531

1

1983

0.5469261

29.17058732

445.8461494

1

1984

0.564948584

31.18045874

467.1953534

1

1985

0.565068407

32.07034017

509.702748

1

1986

0.626153873

33.36866537

530.6135069

1

Year

Nonprofit Almanac 2008, Table 3.4.
2
USGovernmentSpending.com
3
Ibid.
4 Citizens for Tax Justice.
1

Tax Rate4
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1987

0.603727644

33.48457685

541.2755078

1

1988

0.615610393

34.1704706

538.1340853

0

1989

0.650890559

34.69646779

545.8662511

0

1990

0.625468808

34.48655386

589.8803758

0

1991

0.609642421

34.31636171

604.1485937

0

1992

0.624894547

34.47774382

657.6514013

0

1993

0.624515946

34.97454552

694.3953869

1

1994

0.619477017

35.5926593

740.0816879

1

1995

0.612171756

36.02404324

786.0743443

1

1996

0.662401949

36.29539597

821.8720011

1

1997

0.744451833

37.55611433

872.1478567

1

1998

0.785773199

38.49869171

860.394155

1

1999

0.875927101

39.17857279

817.6653541

1

2000

0.955534946

39.74699356

806.8805889

1

2001

0.917349317

40.2932055

870.867496

1

2002

0.899417166

40.1129398

892.3499833

1

2003

0.885909386

40.58178032

936.5167746

1

2004

0.943586915

41.53255253

972.8091854

1

2005

0.992523375

42.11704353

1027.770258

1

2006

0.983989326

43.41394263

1100.293529

1

